[PDF] Password Managers: Attacks and Defenses - Semantic ScholarClient-side attacks are nothing new, but the tools and techniques to execute them are getting better every day. This means the attacks are becoming easier to perform successfully and the increased success rate will fuel the desire for malicious attackers to continue using them for quite some time. The operating systems are usually loaded up with a bunch of fun applications required to help employees complete daily work tasks. These applications often contain vulnerabilities independent from the traditional operating system vulnerabilities we are so used to patching. Well, this one is a tough one to answer — simply because there are so many ways they can work.
Proactive Network Defense
Session cookies constitute one of the main attack targets against client authentication on the Web. To counter that, modern web browsers implement native cookie protection mechanisms based on the Secure and HttpOnly flags. While there is a general understanding about the effectiveness of these defenses, no formal result has so far been proved about the security guarantees they convey. With the present paper we provide the first such result, with a mechanized proof of noninterference assessing the robustness of the Secure and HttpOnly cookie flags against both web and network attacks. We then develop CookiExt , a browser extension that provides client-side protection against session hijacking based on appropriate flagging of session cookies and automatic redirection over HTTPS for HTTP requests carrying such cookies. Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Client-Side Attacks and Defense offers background networks against its attackers. The book examines the forms of client-side attacks and discusses different kinds of attacks along with delivery methods including, but not limited to, browser exploitation, use of rich internet applications, and file format vulnerabilities. It also covers defenses, such as antivirus and anti-spyware, intrusion detection systems, and end-user education. It discusses advanced Web attacks and advanced defenses against them. Moreover, it explores attacks on messaging, Web applications, and mobiles.
Skip to search form Skip to main content. We examine browser built-in password managers, mobile password managers, and 3rd party managers. We observe significant differences in autofill policies among password managers. Several autofill policies can lead to disastrous consequences where a remote network attacker can extract multiple passwords from the user's password manager without any interaction with the user. View PDF. Save to Library.