INSTITUTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT - Ostrom - - Economic Affairs - Wiley Online LibraryA common-pool resource is a resource that can be attributed to the economic category of Common Goods. Characteristic for this kind of goods is, that the access to them is hardly restrictable while the availability is limited. In consequence the sustainability of these resources is endangered. This article describes the peculiarities of common-pool resources and consequences for their governance. Furthermore, an approach of collective governance, which has been developed by the institutional economist Elinor Ostrom  , is presented. No matter if water resources, agricultural land, fishing grounds or forests — the sustainable management of resources is at the core of long lasting food security.
Rules, games, and common-pool resources
Is Economic Growth Sustainable? Why has this almost metaphoric article captured so much attention? Viewing resource users as trapped in a tragedy of their own making is consistent with many textbooks on resource economics and the predictions derived from noncooperative game theory for finitely repeated dilemmas E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker External authorities are presumably needed to impose rules and regulations on local users since they will not do this themselves.
In economics , a common-pool resource CPR is a type of good consisting of a natural or human -made resource system e. Unlike pure public goods , common pool resources face problems of congestion or overuse, because they are subtractable. A common-pool resource typically consists of a core resource e. While the core resource is to be protected or nurtured in order to allow for its continuous exploitation, the fringe units can be harvested or consumed. A common property rights regime system not to be confused with a common-pool resource is a particular social arrangement regulating the preservation, maintenance, and consumption of a common-pool resource. The use of the term "common property resource" to designate a type of good has been criticized, because common-pool resources are not necessarily governed by common property protocols. Examples of common-pool resources include irrigation systems, fishing grounds, pastures , forests , water or the atmosphere.
The theory makes clear contact with some of the essential issues of local versus centralized policy-making and enforcement; and then it convincingly illustrates those issues with a combination of experiments and field evidence. Du kanske gillar. While the tragedy of the commons is real, there are many instances where institutions develop to protect against overexploitation.
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A main feature of OGUMI is its capacity to capture real-time changes in human behaviour in response to a dynamically varying resource. OGUMI is simple for example, likewise other existing software, it does not require expertise in behavioural game theory , stable, and extremely flexible with respect to the user-resource model running in the background. Here we present the motivation for the development of OGUMI and we discuss its main features with an example application. Since the first CPRE—25 years ago [ 1 ]—a growing number of these experiments have been conducted for many different resources, using different sample populations, and with participants of vastly diverse backgrounds, both in the field and in the laboratory. These experiments, as any other economic experiments, have attempted to test theory and to design incentives to overcome common-pool resource dilemmas. Overall, the conclusions of these studies can be summarized as follows: 1 non-cooperative game theoretical solutions do not always hold; and 2 certain institutional settings increase cooperation levels. A careful analysis of the relevant literature suggests that the focus of CPRE research has changed considerably over the last years.